This paper defends a direct reference view of names including empty names. The theory says that empty names literally have no meaning and cannot be used to express truths. Names, including empty names, are associated with accompanying descriptions that are implicated in pragmati‐cally imparted truths when empty names are used. This view is defended against several important objections having to do with differences in names, descriptions associated with the names, and considerations of modality. The view is shown to be superior (...) to an alternative theory treating empty names as the “descriptive names” of Kripke and Evans. (shrink)

To avoid problems with classical theories that take our mental states to represent in virtue of what propositions they represent, and more recent theories that reverse the representational priority, Grzankowski and Buchanan (Philos Stud 176:3159–3178, 2019) propose a “cheap” theory of propositions that does not assume that they are representational entities. They believe that everything there is to know about propositions is provided by the principle that token mental states have the same propositional content if they represent the same things (...) in the same way. I show that the postulated correlation of propositions with mental states does not suffice for propositions to have standard properties like truth values or constituent structures, or to secure the truth of their other basic principle “essentiality of content.” Their theory tells us so little about what propositions are that there is no reason to believe that propositions are object of mental states, or that they exist at all. (shrink)

I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular and property, replacing it (...) with a single fundamental category of intrinsic characters or qualities. We may describe the qualities as qualitative charactersor as modes, perhaps on the model of Aristotelian qualitative (nonsubstantial) kinds, and I will use the term “properties” interchangeably with “qualities”. The qualities are repeatable and reasonably sparse, although, as I discuss in section 2.6, there are empirical reasons that may suggest, depending on one’s preferred fundamental physical theory, that they include irreducibly intensive qualities. There are no uninstantiated qualities. I also assume that the fundamental qualitative natures are intrinsic, although physics may ultimately suggest that some of them are extrinsic. On my view, matter, concrete objects, abstract objects, and perhaps even spacetime are constructed from mereological fusions of qualities, so the world is simply a vast mixture of qualities, including polyadic properties (i.e., relations). This means that everything there is, including concrete objects like persons or stars, is a quality, a qualitative fusion, or a portion of the extended qualitative fusion that is the worldwhole. I call my view mereological bundle theory. (shrink)

A alimentação é uma necessidade de todo o ser vivo, que só pode lutar contra a morte e crescer integrando no seu corpo elementos seleccionados do mundo exterior a que se chama alimentos. Como tantas outras necessidades vitais, a alimentação não pôde eximir-se à interferência religiosa, sob a forma de tabus e outros tipos de restrições, quer para evitar a infracção destas normas sob a forma de pecado, quer para tributar à divindade uma homenagem de latria sob a forma de (...) sacrifícios, quer ainda para compensar o prazer haurido da manducação. E assim se impuseram restrições alimentares e ritos, inicialmente sacrais, muitos dos quais subsistem sob formas de protocolo às vezes bem complicadas. Estas interdições versaram sobre certos tipos de alimentos considerados “impuros” e determinados troços do calendário considerados “de penitência”. Muitas destas normas ainda subsistem, outras perderam-se, mas outras há que nasceram (ou renasceram) como cogumelos. (shrink)

This project explored what constitutes “ethical practice of mathematics”. Thematic analysis of ethical practice standards from mathematics-adjacent disciplines (statistics and computing), were combined with two organizational codes of conduct and community input resulting in over 100 items. These analyses identified 29 of the 52 items in the 2018 American Statistical Association Ethical Guidelines for Statistical Practice, and 15 of the 24 additional (unique) items from the 2018 Association of Computing Machinery Code of Ethics for inclusion. Three of the 29 items (...) synthesized from the 2019 American Mathematical Society Code of Ethics, and zero of the Mathematical Association of America Code of Ethics, were identified as reflective of “ethical mathematical practice” beyond items already identified from the other two codes. The community contributed six unique items. Item stems were standardized to, “The ethical mathematics practitioner…”. Invitations to complete the 30-min online survey were shared nationally (US) via Mathematics organization listservs and other widespread emails and announcements. We received 142 individual responses to the national survey, 75% of whom endorsed 41/52 items, with 90–100% endorsing 20/52 items on the survey. Items from different sources were endorsed at both high and low rates. A final thematic analysis yielded 44 items, grouped into “General” (12 items), “Profession” (10 items) and “Scholarship” (11 items). Moreover, for the practitioner in a leader/mentor/supervisor/instructor role, there are an additional 11 items (4 General/7 Professional). These results suggest that the community perceives a much wider range of behaviors by mathematicians to be subject to ethical practice standards than had been previously included in professional organization codes. The results provide evidence against the argument that mathematics practitioners engaged in “pure” or “theoretical” work have minimal, small, or no ethical obligations. (shrink)

No penúltimo parágrafo de O mundo como vontade e como representação, Schopenhauer, contra a tendência do livro até então, dá um caráter especial à razão na negação da Vontade de vida. O conhecimento abstrato é, nesse contexto, como clarividência da razão, o fundamento para se atingir o conhecimento puramente intuitivo. A partir da análise de algumas formas de conhecimento (conceito, sentimento e Ideia) apresentadas no tomo I da obra, tem-se uma diferenciação clara entre os âmbitos da explicação e da significação (...) do mundo na metafísica da vontade. Assim, o objetivo deste artigo é indicar um possível limite da filosofia, tomando como exemplo a tentativa de conceitualização do nada no último parágrafo da obra, e, por fim, propor uma reflexão acerca do papel do filósofo, para Schopenhauer, na negação da Vontade de vida. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

I argue that despite criticism from some disability rights organizations, aid in dying is morally permissible. First, I suggest that disability-related concerns can be classified as emerging from one of two kinds of harm: person affecting, and personhood affecting. Second, I examine whether person affecting harm has occurred within those jurisdictions that have legalized aid in dying. I conclude that despite suggestions to the contrary, there is no evidence to demonstrate that people with disabilities have been adversely impacted by legalized (...) medical aid in dying. Third, I entertain these same arguments as a matter of principle and conclude the principled objections should not give us reason for concern. Fourth, I explore whether we have evidence to suggest the presence of increased personhood affecting harm where aid in dying is permissible. I suggest, through a focus on disability support services, that no evidence of social attitudes that diminish the moral worth of disabled people is present. Fifth, I examine whether we ought to have a principled concern with personhood affecting harm emerging from medical aid in dying. I conclude that to the contrary, to deny people with disabilities access to aid in dying constitutes a morally egregious form of personhood affecting harm. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, while there are real tensions between phenomenology and critique, it makes a significant difference what we understand phenomenology to be, and that on a good understanding there is room for a project that is genuinely both critical and phenomenological. I will focus on four areas of tension: the eidetic character of phenomenology as opposed to the concrete character of critique; the transcendental orientation of phenomenology as opposed to social and political orientation of critique; the (...) descriptive nature of phenomenology as opposed to the normative nature of critique; and the possibly “naïve” character of phenomenology with respect to the shaping of phenomena by social forces. In each case, I will not try to show that there is no space between phenomenology and critique; rather, I suggest that the tension between the two can be mitigated to allow for a critical phenomenology. (shrink)

Nada propone una interpretación de las diferentes conciencias (arcaica, mágica, mítica, mental e integral) que han ocupado los distintos eones que ha atravesado nuestra especie (urobórico, tifónico, matriarcal, patriarcal y fratriarcal), partiendo de que en todas ellas se ensayan diversos tratos con la nada o lo indeterminado. Se sugiere que, en cada eón, la respectiva conciencia pasa por una fase de ignorancia negativa (no sabe que no sabe), otra de ignorancia positiva (sabe que no sabe), un momento de impasse en (...) el que el decaimiento de una conciencia se cruza con la emergencia de otra, resultando de tal cruce un conocimiento inconsciente (no sabe que sabe), y un momento final de conciencia plena o sabiduría (sabe que sabe) desde el que se precipitan, de nuevo, pero en otro eón y sobre otra conciencia, nuevas ignorancias. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:342 BOOK REVIEWS (5) What follows for the " critical " and " systematic " dimensions of theology, if, accepting Balthasar's centering of thought in (the paradoxes of) love and beauty, one sees mystery, metaphor, concrete imagery, and indeed "myth" as essential and not "accidental" to all theological meaning? In opening up these questions, O'Hanlon's important book identifies the areas where dialogue with Balthasar's work might best begin, even (...) as it makes its own constructive contribution to theology. John Paul II Institute Washington, D.C. DAVID L. SCHINDLER Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. By JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 212. $25.00 (paper). James Keenan says that he began his work on this book " believing the simple presupposition that goodness describes persons and rightness describes actions" (p. ix). The main focus of the study is the question of whether and to what extent this distinction can be found in the work of Aquinas. The author holds that the understanding of the relation of reason and will in the early work of Aquinas precludes the distinction of goodness and rightness held by the author and other contemporary moralists. Keenan claims, however, to find in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae a significant shift in Aquinas's notion of the will and its relation to reason, a shift toward an " autonomous will." Keenan states in the Introduction: "The will's autonomy is a necessary condition for understanding moral goodness "; indeed he proceeds to note that " without it there can be no distinction " between goodness and rightness (pp. ix-x). Before commenting on Keenan's work I will first briefly summarize the basic points of the book. The book is divided into four parts. In the first part we see the distinction between goodness and rightness. Keenan explains the distinction: Goodness and badness describe whether or not we strive to the extent we are able to attain rightness in our lives and actions. Rightness and wrongness describe whether or not we attain the end that reason dictates is proper and necessary for our lives and actions (p. ix). Keenan finds the foundation for this distinction in the reasoning of G. E. Moore. A person's actions can he judged right or wrong independently of a consideration of the person's motives. For instance, a BOOK REVIEWS 343 right action might be performed by a good person or by a bad person, the goodness or badness being determined by the motive. There are, then, two distinct moral descriptions; one, goodness or badness, pertains to persons and the other, rightness and wrongness, pertains to actions. Keenan joins several contemporary moral theologians in claiming something which Moore did not, namely, that " a person who performs a wrong action can be called good for performing the action" (p. 6). This assertion is based upon an understanding of goodness as determined " antecedent to action " (p. 15), and likewise as " antecedent to and distinct from rightness" (p. 7). Moral goodness is determined by the motivation, and motivation alone, of the person acting (p. 14). For example, does the person act out of love for God and neighbor, or rather out of a desire for self-aggrandizement? Jn question here is what Keenan calls the " fundamental, formal self-movement of the agent" (p. 14). Rightness on the other hand is a moral description determined by the measure of reason. It describes actions, and can also describe the agent, in terms of right order in relation to the end of human life. In Part II (the second and third chapters) Keenan turns to the supposed shift in the thought of Aquinas regarding reason and will. Keenan finds the early position of Aquinas incompatible with the distinction of goodness and rightness, but the later position compatible with the distinction. Keenan also presents Aquinas's distinction between specification and exercise in the act of the will as crucial to the distinction between goodness and rightness. I will return to this point shortly. Part III (the fourth and fifth chapters) considers Aquinas's treatises on the human act and moral virtue found in Summa Theologiae I-II. Keenan holds that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:690 BOOK REVIEWS Galileo, Bellarmine and the Bible. By RICHARD J. BLACKWELL. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1991. Pp. 272. $29.95 {cloth). Although this well-hound, manageable volume, complete with an artistic seventeenth-century dust jacket, has not received an official ecclesiastical "imprimatur," nevertheless, it is (according to this Dominican reviewer) both free from doctrinal error and filled with true and useful historical, philosophical, and theological information. Seemingly no (...) other case in the history of our western intellectual tradition has generated more controversy, more ill feeling, and more mutual misunderstanding across more lines of intellectual, political, and religious division than the "Galileo affair." Few people today are equipped historically, scientifically, philosophically, and theologically to discuss accurately the wide range of issues surrounding this unfortunate incident. A seasoned veteran of the strong historical, philosophical tradition of the Jesuit-run St. Louis University, and himself an active member of the Roman Catholic Church, Richard J. Blackwell, historian of philosophy and philosopher of science, has done a marvelous service to the academic community hy presenting us with this volume. In this well-researched, well-argued, and very readable manuscript, Blackwell helps to place Galileo's intellectual and ecclesiastical struggle within the broader historical, philosophical, religious, and theological context of rthe late 16th and early 17th centuries. Quoting the words of Olaf Pedersen, Blackwell considers the Galileo affair " not only as an episode in the history of science, but also as an important event in the history of theology" {p. 3). His principal purpose in writing this book is " to study the Galileo affair from this perspective " and, in particular, to understand "the role played by the Bible in the Galileo affair" (p. 3). Without attempting to praise, to blame, or to excuse, Blackwell sets out to understand precisely how it was that the historical, religious, and theological factors came to have such a profound effect on the scientific and philosophical questions of Galileo's time. He argues convincingly that the Roman insistence on upholding the traditional interpretation of certain key biblical passages can he understood adequately only within the historical and religious climate of postTridentine theology, Jesuit obedience, and strict adherence to the Thomistic synthesis of philosophy and theology. Toward this end, Blackwell brings together for the first time certain important texts, concepts, and historical arguments that help to alleviate some of the " murkiness " blurring our view of the Galileo affair, and help to make that incident more intelligible to our modern minds. BOOK REVIEWS 691 Blackwell argues that the Roman hierarchy was not so much concerned with the content of the new astronomy as it was determined to reassert itself as the authentic interpreter of Scripture and tradition. According to Blackwell, the new astronomy challenged not only the philosophy of Aristotle and the theology of Thomas Aquinas, but, perhaps more importantly, it challenged the ecclesiastical authority of the Roman hierarchy in its role as interpreter and teacher of the Apostolic faith. How could the new astronomy be anything but a hypothetical model, when it so clearly contradicted the words of Scripture as in· terpreted by the Church Fathers? How could mere mathematicians and astronomers insist on philosophical propositions that seemed to make the Bible false? No single individual was invested with the authority to interpret the Bible for the whole body of believers, as the Church had so painfully learned from the lessons of the Protestant Reformers. That authority lay solely with the "Church," that is, with the Roman hierarchy, the Pope in union with a council, as was clear from the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent. Moreover, strict obedience was the order of the day as many Jesuit thinkers so agonizingly came to realize. Blackwell divides his own text into seven chapters: (1) Trent and Beyond; (2) Bellarmine's Views Before the Galileo Affair; (3) Gali· leo's Detour into Biblical Exegesis; (4) Foscarini's Bombshell; (5) The Bible at Galileo's Trial (6) The Jesuit Dilemma: Truth or Obedience ; and (7) Reflections on Truth in Science and in Religion. In the first two chapters, he establishes a context for the Galileo affair by discussing :the theological interpretation and importance of the Council of Trent... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:570 BOOK REVIEWS like reasonable rule for economic life. This effort is worthy of more attention than is possible here, but let it be noted that it must inevitably suffer the same fate as any ethical calculus: someone must decide for others what is their due and what is not. How much wealth, for example, makes for a concentration [of wealth] that would be " demonstrably detrimental to some (...) people's exercise of their generic rights "? His is ultimately an entitlement or rights ethic, rather than an aitial ethic of goal-purposive fulfillment for the individual, projected outwards for a common good scenario. While his rejection of goal ethics's inability to detail principles for distribution of goods is noteworthy, it does not appear that a tightened version of generic rights theory will come closer to either of Phillips's desiderata: a justification of moral reasoning apart from any theory of nature or a calculus for its application. Desan and Phillips wish to think against the limits of the human situation. For Desan, rising above limitation is a moral task and obligation facing us each, if there is to be a common future. His call is to be World Citizen in a Polis of Nations. Phillips's vision is more concrete, a distribution of benefits to benefit all with well-being and freedom. But this mundane task is no less difficult than Desan's transcendent one. Indeed, according to Augustine, even the Divine Mind must utilize an artifice in dealing with human creation: "He loves each of us as though there were only one of us." Both ethicists have striven to show us how we might think this vision for ourselves, i.e., for each other of us. ]OIIN B. DAVIS, O.P. ' Detroit, Michigan Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays. By HUGH TREVOR-ROPER. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pp. xiii + 317. $27.50 (hardbound). Even to list the changes and events which occurred in seventeenth century England is a difficult task: the century spans the period from the death of Queen Elizabeth to the Glorious Revolution and beyond, through the Civil War, the accession and exile (twice) of the Stuarts, the rise of science, the transformation of the theological and religious issues of the English Reformation, to name only the most obvious. To conceive a book, in the form of occasional essays, which not only addresses these changes and events but does so by establishing the connections which were present with European currents at the same time surely tempts fate, even when it does not tempt reviewers. BOOK REVIEWS 571 But Hugh Trevor-Roper is a master, both of the period under survey and of the form of the essay. With one exception, each of these essays began as a lecture or seminar paper, and the pleasantly legible style in which they are written must bear some trace of that origin. The occasional flashes of wit, mixed with rthe fairly non-technical style, make the book a joy to read and a welcome escape from the usually constipated style of scholarly prose. In his Introduction, the essayist clearly sets forth his thesis that English intellectual history does not exist apart from the currents of European intellectual history (a thesis for which Trevor-Roper has already staked a claim). That leads to what may very well be the major problem with these essays: its end is in its beginning. The list of names cited in these essays only partially coincides with the list of names in the index; the former is much longer than the latter. And while the style of the essay welcomes the reader to the period, it also throws up more names and places and events than can be explained or even annotated adequately. This occurs both on a large and on a small scale. The first essay, on "Nicholas Hill, the English Atomist" contains such a vast array of names that at times it becomes the prosopo· graphical equivalent of a telephone book. On a large scale, there is the problem with a definition of Arminianism. No definition, at least no formal definition, is attempted-and this is probably wise. But, particularly in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Galileo: For Copemicanism and for the Church. By ANNIBALE FANTOLI. Translated by George V. Coyne, S.J. Studi Galileiani Vol. 3. Vatican City: Vatican Observatory Publications, 1994. Distributed by the University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. Pp. xix+ 540. $21.95 (paper). This exhaustive treatment of Galileo and his relationship to the Church was first published in Italian by the Vatican Observatory in 1993 as Vol. 2 (...) of its Studi Galileiani series, bearing the title Galileo: Per il Copemicanesimo e per la Chiesa. So excellent was the study that Father George Coyne, the director of the Vatican Observatory, took it on himself personally to translate the volume into English. Although not a member of the Galileo Commission set up by Pope John Paul II to review the Galileo case, as were Coyne and myself, Fantoli has admirably complemented the work of the Commission and his book surely belongs in the Studi Galileiani collection. A former Jesuit with degrees in mathematics and physics, Fantoli began the book more than twenty-five years ago when he was preparing a course on Galileo at Sophia University in Tokyo. His intention was to show that for Galileo it was never a question of choosing between Copernicanism and the Church, and that the saddest drama of his life was being faced with an injunction that forced him to befor the Church and against Copemicanism. The subtitle of his book proclaims Galileo's true intentions, despite his failure to convince others that this was what his life was all about. A great strength of Fantoli's treatment is its documentation, which abounds in excerpts from Galileo's writings and his correspondence as found in the National Edition of his works and also in citations from new materials that have been uncovered by the Galileo Commission. Thanks to Coyne, all of these texts, many of which were hitherto available only in Latin or Italian, can now be easily accessed in English translation. Another strength of Fantoli's work is that he has kept abreast of Galileo literature over the years and thus is able to offer scholarly critiques of authors whose works exhibit a bias against the Church. Especially welcome are his careful discussions of the positions of earlier writers such as Giorgio de Santillana, Ludovico Geymonat, and Stillman Drake, as well as those of more recent authors, Mario Biagioli, Maurice Finocchiaro, Pietro Redondi, William R. Shea, and Richard S. Westfall. The book is a tour de force and there is little to criticize in it. Unfortunately, however, a typesetting error at its very beginning might create 317 318 BOOK REVIEWS the wrong impression and throw off prospective readers. About six lines of text were omitted at the bottom of page 9. To remedy this the following words should be inserted between the end of page 9 and the beginning of page 10: confused with the Sun) which had heen worked out by Philolaus (about 475 B.C.) within the context of the Pythagorean school.9 In a further modification of this theory the central fire as well as the hypothesis of an anti-earth were done away with, which left the earth at the center of the universe. To offset this addition, the last six lines on the bottom of page 10 should be deleted, for these lines are repeated at the top of page 11. Otherwise, with this change, the exposition reads correctly. The remaining typographical errors are few and in no case do they affect the sense. After a brief introduction in which he presents the astronomical concepts necessary for understanding the details of the Copernican debate, Fantoli divides his treatment into seven chapters. The first two of these are devoted to Galileo's early life and teaching at the Universities of Pisa and Padua, his perfection of the telescope, and the beginnings of the controversies about the earth's motion that were provoked by his telescopic discoveries, The next three chapters then take up the scriptural arguments in detail, Galileo's battle with the Jesuits over the comets of 1618 and his The Assayer of 1623, and his resumption of the Copernican program with the publication of his Dialogue... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Inference That Makes Science. By ERNAN McMULLIN. The Aquinas Lecture, 1992. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1992. Pp. iv +112. In this ambitious lecture Father Ernan McMullin recapitulates and refines a thesis that has guided his thought for the past forty years. In essence the thesis is this: precisely how science is made has eluded the best minds for centuries, and only in the work of Charles (...) Sanders Peirce, suitably emended by McMullin, has the puzzle finally been solved. " Retroduction " is the inference that makes science. Once this is understood, errors on what constitutes scientific method-those of Aristotle, Aquinas, Galileo, Newton, Bacon, Hume, et al.-can be rectified and one can see science for what it truly is: a complex process of theory appraisal that yields, not definitive truth, but well-established results to which assent can be given with at best "practical certainty," whatever that might be (pp. 91-96). Why McMullin should have chosen such a theme for an Aquinas Lecture is a question that defies reasonable answer. Surely one does not have to he so negative about the thought of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Galileo to advance one's ideas about science in the present day. What McMullin could easily have done, and he hints at this in the last two paragraphs of his lecture (pp. 97-98), is show how retroduction is itself simply a relaxed version of the demonstrative regress, the method actually endorsed by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Galileo. Such a retroductive version, fair enough, yields knowledge of a probable cause, the type of knowledge most typical of modern science. McMullin did not have to embark on the dangerous course of trying to prove that proof and certainty are forever beyond the grasp of science, or that never in the history of science has anyone established a definitive truth. That, in effect, is what McMullin has tried to do, and in the attempt to make the point he fumbles at almost every juncture throughout a very long lecture. To set the record straight more than a review is being re--·quested; perhaps a book, and even that might not suffice for those whose minds are made up. To understand the import of the lecture one must appreciate that it is hut a brief episode in a debate over demonstration in science that has been going on since McMullin first came to the University of Notre Dame in 1954. I myself have published many hooks and articles that engage the very point of his lecture and provide the contra evidence to 131 132 BOOK REVIEWS show elements of continuity in scientific method from Aristotle to the present. My last two volumes, in press at the same time as McMullin's Aquinas Lecture, answer in detail the aporiai he there raises.1 I need 1 Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof. The Backgrnund, Content, and Use of His Appropriated Treatises on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 137. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, xxiii + 323 pp.; Galileo's Logical Treatises. A Translation, with Notes and Commentary, of His Appropriated Questions on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 138. DordrechtBoston -London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, xix + 239 pp. only refer the interested reader to them for an extended and documented reply to his arguments. Some idea of the flavor of our debate, however, can be gained from the following. To support his thesis, McMullin has to maintain that Aristotle's proof that the moon is a sphere (from its having phases) and that Galileo's proofs that there are mountains on the moon, that Jupiter has satellites, and that Venus circles the sun (all based on telescopic observations) are not strictly demonstrative, that is, they do not yield true and certain conclusions. He declines to answer a query I have often tendered whether he personally is certain on the basis of pre-spacecraft evidence that the moon is a sphere, that there are mountains on it, that Jupiter has satellites, and so on. Instead he offers the categorical response "that planetary science is not an apodictic science, indeed that no natural science is... (shrink)

Por Laura Fraga de Almeida Sampaio, tradutora do livro A aula inaugural, que Foucault pronunciou ao assumir a cátedra vacante no Collège de France pela morte de Hyppolite, pode ser considerada um texto de ligação entre suas obras, datadas dos anos 60, como História da loucura, As palavras e as coisas, A arqueologia do saber, centradas predominantemente na análise das condições de possibilidade das ciências humanas, e as que se seguiram a maio de 68, como Vigiar e punir, voltados ao (...) exame da microfisica do poder. Foucault desvenda a relação entre as práticas discursivas e os poderes que as permeiam. Ao perceber os diversos procedimentos que cerceiam e controlam os discursos da sociedade, o autor comprova que "o discurso não é simplesmente aquilo que traduz as lutas ou os sistemas de dominação, mas aquilo pelo que se luta, o poder de queremos nos apoderar". Na segunda parte do texto, Foucault anuncia a direção em que prosseguirá suas investigações no decorrer dos cursos no Collège de France, apontando para o que denomina o "conjunto crítico" e o "conjunto genealógico" e lança o projeto de estudo das interdições que atingem o discurso da sexualidade. A este trabalho dedicará muitos anos, após a publicação do primeiro volume da História da sexualidade, em 1976: A vontade de saber (uso dos prazeres, vol.2, O cuidado de si, vol, 3, ambos de 1984). (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é o de esboçar a prova da existência de Deus traçada por Agostinho de Hipona no segundo livro do De libero arbitrio. Tendo em vista tal fim, na primeira parte desta pesquisa, examinar-se-á o critério indicado pelo Hiponense para provar que Deus existe. Em seguida, isto é, na segunda etapa deste estudo, analisar-se-á a reflexão agostiniana sobre a Verdade como objeto comum e imutável do conhecimento da razão humana. Por fim, na terceira parte desta pesquisa, examinar-se-á (...) por que a Verdade é superior à razão e assim mostrar-se-á por que, para Agostinho, Deus existe. (shrink)

The place occupied by Kant’s philosophical ideas in the reflections of the Russian philosopher, Nikolay Strakhov, needs further study. The material for a historical-philosophical reconstruction of Strakhov’s reception of Kant’s philosophy is the Russian thinker’s home library catalogue, his correspondence and his own philosophical works. Among Strakhov’s interlocutors were not only philosophers and natural scientists, but also writers, including Fyodor Dostoevsky, Leo Tolstoy and Afanasy Fet, who in many ways determined the cultural and intellectual horizon of the epoch. The many (...) years of correspondence with the last two writers went a long way to shape and develop Strakhov’s perception of Kant as a thinker. Indeed, without a virtual dialogue with Kant no modern philosophical system can be built. Strakhov’s reflections on the Kantian style of thinking, adoption of Kantian criticism as the model of epistemic analysis in many ways determined the features of his own philosophical work and became a catalyst of renewed interest in Russia in the Kantian philosophy in the last third of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Ethics support staff help others to deal with moral challenges. However, they themselves can also experience moral challenges such as issues regarding (breaching) confidentiality when practicing ethics support. Currently there is no insight in these confidentiality issues and also no professional guidance for dealing with them. To gain insight into moral challenges related to Moral Case Deliberation (MCD), we studied a) beliefs and experiences of MCD facilitators regarding breaching confidentiality, b) considerations for (not) breaching confidentiality, and c) needs for an (...) ethics support tool. Data collection consisted of qualitative research methods: six semi-structured interviews; analyses of a) two recorded MCD sessions, and b) a focus group with MCD facilitators. Findings: MCD facilitators mention different conceptions and interpretations of confidentiality and various moral challenges. Questions concerning confidentiality ultimately cause reflections on roles and responsibilities of facilitators. Needs for ethics support vary from seeking advice to procedural and sometimes normative guidance for MCD facilitators. Education for MCD facilitators should focus on developing a concrete tool that stimulates awareness and reflection(skills). (shrink)

How (Not) to Be Secular is what Jamie Smith calls "your hitchhiker's guide to the present" -- it is both a reading guide to Charles Taylor's monumental work A Secular Age and philosophical guidance on how we might learn to live in our times. Taylor's landmark book A Secular Age (2007) provides a monumental, incisive analysis of what it means to live in the post-Christian present -- a pluralist world of competing beliefs and growing unbelief. Jamie Smith's book is a (...) compact field guide to Taylor's insightful study of the secular, making that very significant but daunting work accessible to a wide array of readers. Even more, though, Smith's How (Not) to Be Secular is a practical philosophical guidebook, a kind of how-to manual on how to live in our secular age. It ultimately offers us an adventure in self-understanding and maps out a way to get our bearings in today's secular culture, no matter who "we" are -- whether believers or skeptics, devout or doubting, self-assured or puzzled and confused. This is a book for any thinking person to chew on. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es evaluar la importancia de los líderes africanos en la política exterior de sus países. A partir de una revisión comprehensiva de literatura especializada, se evidencia la intrascendencia en África de los marcos teóricos tradicionales del análisis de política exterior, los cuales se basan principalmente en la experiencia diplomática de las grandes potencias. En el contexto de los países africanos, por el contrario, la unidad decisoria final no está institucionalizada, por lo cual la visión de (...) mundo de los líderes se transforma en prácticamente la única referencia para la fijación de la estrategia internacional y el interés nacional. (shrink)

The works of Emmanuel Levinas, a survivor of the Nazi horror, are striking in the constancy of their thought and the strength of their appeal. We are not condemned to evil and hatred; rather, we are called to be-for-each-other. For You Alone explores the relational and religious quality of Levinas' work. Our lives are always twofold rather than "one and the same." A relational life is dependent on encounters that are revelatory. Revelation means that life is no mere sameness but (...) is tied to the revelation of the other, to you. Here is transcendence par excellence. Here is what the name of God signifies, the relational and ethical bond that takes us outside ourselves toward the other in our midst. What could be more natural, more human, or more divine than to speak of the relational quality of life? An answerable life means that we are asked after, called, required. "Here I am under your gaze," Levinas writes, "obliged to you, your servant. In the name of God.". (shrink)

Often an action causes both evil and benefit for the agent. No general account can be given for what happens when one considers in light of this evil and benefit whether to undertake the action in question. Prichard maintains that in willing a movement, there are two acts of will. First, there is the willing to think more of what one shall gain in willing x, which results from the desire to will x. Second, there is the willing of the (...) change x. (shrink)

Our recent paper reported that 43% of reviewer comment sets shared with authors contained at least one unprofessional comment or an incomplete, inaccurate of unsubstantiated critique. Publication of this work sparked an online conversation surrounding professionalism in peer review. We collected and analyzed these social media comments as they offered real-time responses to our work and provided insight into the views held by commenters and potential peer-reviewers that would be difficult to quantify using existing empirical tools. Overall, 75% of comments (...) were positive, of which 59% were supportive and 16% shared similar personal experiences. However, a subset of negative comments emerged, that provided potential insight into the reasons underlying unprofessional comments were made during the peer-review process. These comments were classified into three main themes: forced niceness will adversely impact the peer-review process and allow for publication of poor-quality science ; dismissing comments as not offensive to another person because they were not deemed personally offensive to the reader ; and authors brought unprofessional comments upon themselves as they submitted substandard work. Here, we argue against these themes as justifications for directing unprofessional comments towards authors during the peer review process. We argue that it is possible to be both critical and professional, and that no author deserves to be the recipient of demeaning ad hominem attacks regardless of supposed provocation. Suggesting otherwise only serves to propagate a toxic culture within peer review. While we previously postulated that establishing a peer-reviewer code of conduct could help improve the peer-review system, we now posit that priority should be given to repairing the negative cultural zeitgeist that exists in peer-review. (shrink)

Kant’s efforts to replace psychology as a theoretical natural science with anthropology as a pragmatic science are examined on the basis of his anthropology lectures. For Kant, psychology posits the soul as a distinct substance, but his pragmatic anthropology makes no such metaphysical assumption. It can succeed by limiting itself to providing historical rather than rational cognition, being descriptive rather than explanative, and having a worldly rather than an academic perspective. Kant’s reflections on culture in the Critique of Judgment are (...) claimed to account for certain final changes in the anthropology that was published in 1798. (shrink)

George Santayana (1863–1952) believed that a philosophy of orthodox common sense exists beneath all major systems of philosophy and religion. This philosophy is a form of naturalism. It begins with the assumption that we are animals generated by and sustained for a time within a vast impersonal physical cosmos that is the sole source of power. Although rational argumentation cannot justify this assumption, our actions repeatedly confirm it, and we could not live without it. Another central feature of Santayana’s philosophy (...) of naturalism is that we are conscious as well as active animals. The inner light of awareness, or what he calls “spirit,” arises by the activities of the physical body but is itself powerless. Our experience of the world is rendered in the morally charged signs of human cognition, and these may be aesthetically appreciated for their own sake in imagination, granting us the possibility of contemplative respite from the exigencies of life. Santayana’s philosophy is atheistic and holds out no religious hope of redemption. Still, it is celebratory of the life of consciousness and offers a path toward naturalistic spirituality. (shrink)

La historia de la filosofía redescubierta a través del singular prisma de la fenomenología del cuerpo no se presenta ya como la historia de las grandes ideas, sino de algunas pequeñas preguntas: una historia de los restos, las sombras y los márgenes de la filosofía. Merleau-Ponty saca a la luz fragmentos de esa otra historia sirviéndose de un único procedimiento cuya práctica constante no parece expresar tanto un método como una obsesión, cuando insiste en formular a los filósofos del pasado (...) la misma pequeña pregunta con la que interpelaba a su amigo Althusser mientras discutían por la madrugada: "Pero usted también tiene un cuerpo, ¿no es así?". Cada filosofía, señala Merleau-Ponty, es una elección filosófica, pero "por más que los filósofos escojan, su elección siempre está acompañada, como al margen, de la sospecha de lo que han dejado de lado". Ese margen acompaña a cada filósofo como su propia sombra. Esta obra explora las distintas aproximaciones de Merleau-Ponty a ciertas obras canónicas de la historia de la filosofía. Acompañar el diálogo de su fenomenología con las célebres teorías del conocimiento de Aristóteles, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Bergson o Husserl significa simultáneamente esbozar una historia de las filosofías del cuerpo y el sentir. Esteban A. García es Doctor en Filosofía por la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Se desempeña como Profesor de Gnoseología en la misma universidad y como Investigador Independiente en el Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (Argentina). Es autor de los libros Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Filosofía, corporalidad y percepción (2012); Percepción y lectura en la filosofía de Simone Weil (2015) y de numerosas publicaciones en las áreas de fenomenología, filosofía francesa contemporánea y filosofía moderna. (shrink)

Prominent atheists claim the Bible is a racist text. Yet Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. read it daily. Then again, so did many ardent segregationists. Some atheists claim religion serves to oppress the masses. Yet the classic text of the French Revolution, What is the Third Estate?, was written by a priest. On the other hand, the revolutionaries ended up banning religion. What do we make of religion's confusing role in history? And what of religion's relationship to science? Some scientists (...) claim that we have no free will. Others argue that advances in neurobiology and physics disprove determinism. As for whispering to the universe, an absurd habit say the skeptics. Yet prayer is a transformative practice for millions. This book explores the most common atheist critiques of the Bible and religion, incorporating Jewish, Christian, and Muslim voices. The result is a fresh, modern re-evaluation of religion and of atheism. (shrink)

la juventud se ha convertido, desde el inicio de la crisis en 2008, en un tema mediático y objeto de estudio e investigación así como de diseño de políticas públicas que incluyan el objetivo de paliar la situación de dificultad y precariedad en la que se encuentran muchos jóvenes en la actualidad. Jóvenes con una gran formación y que tienen que abandonar el país por no encontrar empleo adecuado en españa; jóvenes que abandonaron el sistema educativo para incorporarse al mercado (...) laboral y que con la crisis se han quedado sin empleo; jóvenes que no pueden emanciparse por carecer de medios y que como consecuencia de ello, alargan la permanencia en casa de sus padres. Jóvenes que en definitiva ven un futuro incierto en sus vidas. el objetivo de esta introducción es ofrecer una breve panorámica y una presentación de los diferentes artículos incluidos en el presente número de la revista.Youth has become since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, a media subject and also an object of study and research as well as an object of design of public policies with the aim of alleviating the difficult and precarious situation in which many young people are today. Young highly educated who have to leave the country because they don’t find suitable employment in Spain; young people who left the education system to enter the labor market and lost their jobs with this crisis; young people who can not emancipate for lack of means and as a result, extend the stay at their parental home. Young ultimately see an uncertain future in their lives. The purpose of this introduction is to provide a brief overview and presentation of the different articles in this issue of the magazine. (shrink)

Science studies scholars often study up to high-tech elites who produce and design scientific knowledge and technology. Methodological tension begins when you pair a desire to study down to less economically developed countries, with the desire to study up to high-tech elites within them. This becomes further complicated when the ethnographer and his/her informants share professional interests and credentials. In these situations, the researcher has high status because of geopolitical privilege. However, the researcher is neither a high-tech elite nor a (...) local cultural elite. How might the ethnographer successfully access and navigate field sites imbued with these unseen power differentials? There are currently no visual mapping tools to enhance the process of reflexivity by feminist ethnographers, as they consider their globally embedded multiple, hierarchical, and situated positionality. This reflection methodology piece provides a tool to consider this phenomenon, as it exists across the Global North/south divide of power. Such a tool would be useful to northern ethnographers to better strategize ethics and access while avoiding complicity with structures of inequality and empowering their southern interlocutors. (shrink)

Arguments concerning divine conservation and concurrence often assume that actions of certain descriptions would be superfluous if God were to perform them, and it is then concluded that God does not perform such actions. In particular, it often seems that atomic actions cannot be the result of cooperative activity between God and creatures since there is no apparent way to divide the labor between the two. However, the actions that are atomic in one model of divine action may not be (...) atomic on another. On fine-grained models there may be unexpected prospects for nonredundant divine action. (shrink)

We describe the national health research ethics review system of Uzbekistan and identify policy and program gaps that impede the protection of human research subjects. We find that the National Ethic Committee (NEC), functioning at the national level, is solely responsible for conducting research ethics review. There is little evidence that regional ethics committees work as intended, and there is no research ethics review at medical institutes and research centers even though they conduct CDTs (clinical drug trials). There is no (...) national policy for the ethical review of non-clinical trials. We recommend the establishment of institutional review boards (IRBs) at medical institutes and research centers while at the same time building capacity at the national level to oversee and support the research ethics review system of the entire country. (shrink)

O ensaio procura investigar a ideia de educação moral defendida por Jean Piaget em sua conferência intitulada “Os procedimentos de educação moral”, proferida em Paris, no ano de 1930. Concentra-se em reconstruir o núcleo central apresentado pelo autor, ou seja, a tensão entre a dupla moralidade e a ambiguidade entre heteronomia e autonomia que constitui a moralidade infantil e que se alicerça em sentimentos de respeito opostos, de unilateralidade e de reciprocidade. Ocupa-se também em confrontar os procedimentos típicos da educação (...) tradicional com os procedimentos próprios da educação progressiva que impulsionam a posição ativa do educando para a construção dos aspectos da internalização da lei e da possibilidade das relações de cooperação e respeito pelo outro nos grupos de convivência, especialmente no período da infância. Destaca a necessária presença do adulto, como aquele que exerce o papel de mediação na relação entre ele, a criança e o mundo, principalmente do professor na educação infantil pela compreensão do domínio psicológico da infância, para pensarmos por que a criança age, como ela age e de que forma age. Por fim, conclui procurando mostrar a atualidade desta reflexão do jovem Piaget para os nossos dias, mesmo se passando quase um século, revelando a importância da releitura dos clássicos para a reflexão, compreensão e intervenção em problemáticas educacionais atuais. Sua crítica ao autoritarismo inerente à determinada concepção de educação moral serve ainda como resistência ao conservadorismo autoritário atual e, ao mesmo tempo, para reestabelecer os laços cooperativos e solidários proporcionados pela ampla tradição da educação moral autônoma, oferecendo as condições intelectuais e psicológicas necessárias para o desenvolvimento saudável e o ingresso autônomo na sociedade adulta. (shrink)

Healthcare systems need to consider not only how to prevent error, but how to respond to errors when they occur. In the United Kingdom’s National Health Service, one strand of this latter response is the ‘No Blame Culture’, which draws attention from individuals and towards systems in the process of understanding an error. Defences of the No Blame Culture typically fail to distinguish between blaming someone and holding them responsible. This article argues for a ‘responsibility culture’, where healthcare professionals are (...) held responsible in cases of foreseeable and avoidable errors. We demonstrate how healthcare professionals can justifiably be held responsible for their errors even though they work in challenging circumstances. We then review the idea of ‘responsibility without blame’, applying this to cases of error in healthcare. Sensitive to the undesirable effects of blaming healthcare professionals and to the moral significance of holding individuals accountable, we argue that a responsibility culture has significant advantages over a No Blame Culture due to its capacity to enhance patient safety and support medical professionals in learning from their mistakes, while also recognising and validating the legitimate sense of responsibility that many medical professionals feel following avoidable error, and motivating medical professionals to report errors. (shrink)

It is important to recognize that the problem dealt with by Plato in the central part of the Sophist is one which arises from the use of certain Greek phrases, and has no necessary or direct connexion with metaphysics. We tend to obscure this fact if we use English terms such as ‘Being’, ‘Reality’, ‘Existence’, etc., in discussing the dialogue, and indeed make it almost impossible to understand what Plato is trying to do. It is the way in which die (...) Greek terms ỗν and μή ỗν and other such terms are used by the ‘sophists’ which gives rise to the problem. (shrink)

O presente trabalho concentra-se no exame das concepções de saúde e de moléstia do médico paranaense Nilo Cairo (1874-1928).Através da contextualização do pensamento de Nilo Cairo, e de suaanálise interna, buscamos compreender a relação entre este médico, o vitalismo e a homeopatia, inseridos num contexto onde a ascensão da teoria microbiana das doenças e da medicina de laboratório era algo hegemônico. Apoiados em Georges Canguilhem e nas fontes empíricas, propomos uma longa duração do vitalismo, corrente esta que surge em meados (...) do século XVII, estendendo-se até pelo menos o século XX, como podemos evidenciar neste trabalho. Nossa abordagem se caracteriza não só pelo enfoque interno como também social da História das Ciências. Mediante a epistemologia de Canguilhem, de seu diálogo com Thomas Kuhn, com teses de doutorado defendidas no Brasil, e com as fontes empíricas, buscamos a compreensão de uma possível resistência do pensamento vitalista e sua coexistência com os paradigmas hegemônicos das ciências médicas ocidentais. Pensamentoscomo o de Nilo Cairo podem ser considerados evidências que refutam a noção de uma ciência que evolui linearmente e de formaunidimensional. (shrink)

To dismiss the problems of Socratic moral intellectualism as well as Socratic irony (with respect to his claims of ignorance) in the following we shall first discuss how there are different forms of not-knowing in the Platonic dialogues. By referencing various passages throughout Plato’s entire corpus we shall see that like his nuanced understanding of knowledge, Plato also delineated between kinds of ignorance with only one denying virtue and the good life to individuals. This will prove that Socrates does not (...) associate with a reprehensible state when he claims ignorance and thus there is no need to appeal to irony when he makes such avowals of not-knowing. In the second half of this essay I will also suggest that the knowledge to which Socrates appeals is not an “ironic” appeal to human knowledge, as various scholars have argued, but is a sincere appeal to divine knowledge, i.e. immediate wisdom, which all human beings possess and rely on in their daily lives. In other words, Socratic knowing is a kind of enigmatic knowing which must be understood as a pre-theoretical, unexamined or innate wisdom. For Socrates all individuals “possess” such wisdom but in order to do the work that is “properly” human, i.e. the work allowing for virtue, one must enigmatically marry this “knowledge” with recognized ignorance. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on armchair inquiry. Thought experiment has the feel of clairvoyance, thus eliciting awe in some and suspicion in others. But the wonder of thought experiment is just a special case of our vague puzzlement about how a question could be answered by merely thinking. There is no mystery when investigators look, measure, and manipulate. Their answers come from the news borne by observation and experiment. But if you just ponder, then the information you have leaving the armchair (...) is the same as the information you had when you sat down. It is argued that part of our wonder is based on a modal fallacy. The theories of armchair inquiry that promise answers to the legitimate portion of our wonder are surveyed. Finally, a cleansing model of rationality that sets the stage for a detailed analysis of how thought experiments work is developed. (shrink)

A obra “No Enxame: Perspectiva do Digital” de Byung-Chul Han faz uma reflexão sobre o campo da mídia digital apresentando-o metaforicamente como uma janela, não apenas para que possamos assistir os acontecimentos do mundo de maneira passiva, como também uma porta que se comunica com outras moradias e pessoas ativamente, embora sem que haja possibilidade de intermediadores, o que justifica as suas potencialidades constitutivas, bem como os seus perigos. Para tanto, o autor aponta que há uma transformação nas relações sociais (...) de massa, dado que o ser humano está em uma situação de contestação própria individualismo, além de conectado na era da tecnologia, uma condição sobreposta, devido ao acesso aos meios digitais e à revolução das relações sociais ocasionadas também pelos meios tecnológicos, gerando um fenômeno aparentemente contraditório: a distância mental entre os indivíduos.Nestes espaços públicos virtuais em que nos relacionamos, mesmo diante da possibilidade de controle do comportamento social, que se dirige tanto ao âmbito privado quanto ao público e que, por isto mesmo, percebe-se a necessidade de incluirmos neste afã de comunicação a precaução, segundo a suposição de que seria possível deter a constituição de ideologias de massa em desconformidade com a manutenção da vida, da harmonia social e da democracia, devido à percepção de que, nas tomadas de decisão, interesses perniciosos poderiam também se insinuar. Neste particular, Han esclarece que não somos mais apenas destinatários e consumidores passivos de informação, mas sim remetentes e produtores ativos, de modo que não nos contentamos apenas consumir como também passamos a produzir informação.O livro foi organizado em um prefácio, seguido de dezesseis seções, nas quais os assuntos abordados se relacionam entre si, contudo, independentes em suas próprias abordagens. Nesta resenha foram analisadas todas as seções e, dessa maneira, serão apresentadas conforme se dispõe na obra “No Enxame: Perspectiva do Digital”. E, no que diz respeito ao prefácio, recomenda-se a leitura, por fornecer esclarecimento prévio ao leitor. Por fim, o livro é recomendável para todos os entusiastas do campo da mídia digital e, principalmente, dos assuntos relacionados a uma sociedade de massas que se fora em paralelo com as tecnologias digitais. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresenta um recorte de uma pesquisa de trabalho de conclusão de curso, cujo objetivo foi analisar as especificidades de como ocorre a Educação de Jovens e Adultos – EJA – de mulheres que vivem em situação carcerária, bem como as contribuições e limitações do processo educacional para a ressignificação e reinserção na sociedade. Especificamente a pesquisa se propõe a compreender como ocorre a Educação de Jovens e Adultos no sistema penitenciário feminino; apontar as contribuições da EJA no (...) processo de escolarização e reinserção de mulheres que vivem em situação de cárcere; e identificar as dificuldades e limitações encontradas na promoção da aprendizagem escolar no sistema prisional feminino no Conjunto Penal Nilton Gonçalves em Vitória da Conquista–BA. Optamos por uma pesquisa exploratória, de caráter qualitativo na perspectiva de desenvolvermos um estudo de caso. A pesquisa aponta a necessidade de ser estabelecido um processo educacional que contribua para ressignificação e ressocialização da pessoa encarcerada, bem como programas com práticas sócio-educativas que são garantidos por lei, mas que na prática pouco acontecem. (shrink)

The case of the revocation of ordination from the two pastors by the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa (hereafter, ELCSA) in the Gauteng Province, Pretoria, South Africa has motivated the present conversation. In order to respond appropriately to the scenario mentioned earlier, the research will dialogue with Paul’s teaching on spiritual gifts in Romans 11:29–32. The document released by the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria (hereafter, HCoSAP) ruled that ELCSA acted against the law and ordered that (...) the revocation of the ordination be reversed (Case No: 62810/2018). The study comprises three main layers as follows: (1) analysis of ordination in the biblical text, including a dialogue with Paul’s view of calling and spiritual gifts in 11:29–32, (2) a ruling by the HCoSAP, and (3) a critique of ELCSA. Documentary analysis, ethnography, and participant observation are employed as methodological approaches.Contribution: The contribution of this research is two-fold. Firstly, the readership in general and believing communities in particular should adhere to the rules of the game as prescribed by the biblical text so that they will mitigate both conflict and confrontation with other congregants. Secondly, the study aims to educate societies that no one is above the law. Members of the sacred institution can appear at the high court either when their constitutional right is violated or as suspects of crime. (shrink)

Based on a review of the literature and historical evidence, I argue that the use of the methodological principle known as the priority principle in Anglo-American Nietzsche scholarship is inconsistent and irreconcilable with historical evidence. It attempts to demarcate between the published works and the Nachlass. However, there are no agreed upon necessary and sufficient conditions of a particular textual object being considered “Nachlass.” This absence leads to implicit and often tacit value demarcation criteria that can be broadly grouped into (...) four types of consideration: publication, authorization, publicness, and audience. Each of these criteria pick out a different set of texts as “Nachlass.” Thus, despite the veneer of agreement, the most broadly accepted methodological approach in the Anglo-American tradition of Nietzsche scholarship is applied inconsistently. I argue that we must either offer necessary and sufficient conditions for a piece of text being Nachlass, or we ought to abandon such abstract criteria altogether and embrace a contextual and historical approach. I then argue that the first option is impossible given historical evidence. I conclude this article by explicating several recent German approaches to the Nachlass which I think can offer a new possible approach. (shrink)

How may feelings of love and hate impact people’s attention? We used a modified Attentional Blink (AB) task in which 300 participants were asked to categorise a name representing a person towards whom they felt either hate, love, or neutral (first target) plus identify a number word (second target), both embedded in a rapidly presented stream of other words. The lag to the second target was systematically varied. Contrary to our hypothesis, results revealed that both hated and loved names resulted (...) in higher accuracy for the second target than neutral names, which was largely independent of lag. Also, there we observed no sustained transfer effects of love and hate onto neutral name trials. The findings differ from prior research on attentional blink and transient, non-personal, stimulus-driven emotions, suggesting that interpersonal feelings activate different attention-relevant mechanisms. Relevant to future research, we speculate that love and hate are motivators of goal-directed behaviour that facilitate subsequent information processing. (shrink)

_Resumen:_ Al interior de la tradición clásica del derecho natural, los teólogos escolásticos de los siglos xvi-xvii describen ese derecho como simplemente necesario, así como inmutable y universal. Lo describen, además, como un orden objetivo, independiente de la voluntad de Dios. Sin embargo, no todos los teólogos escolásticos entienden la inmutabilidad del derecho natural de la misma forma, ni llaman “derecho natural” exactamente a lo mismo: para unos este es el “derecho de la naturaleza”, mientras que para otros es el (...) “derecho de la razón natural”. El artículo, así, aborda las principales diferencias que existen en las teorías de estos escolásticos sobre el derecho natural. (shrink)

Background. Ethics are rules or standards governing the conduct of a person or members of a profession. Medical research must be regulated to ensure that fundamental human rights are not breached in the quest for knowledge. Nigeria had no laws or specific guidelines to regulate health research until 2007, when a national regulatory body, the National Health Research Ethics Committee, was established. Its function is to ensure ethical conduct in research and to accredit institutional and state health research ethics committees.Objective. (...) To document the current role of HRECs in the ethical practice of health research in Nigeria, 4 years after the establishment of the NHREC.Methods. Functioning of the HRECs was evaluated via interviews of 14 members of state and institutional HRECs chosen from selected geopolitical zones of the country.Results. The HRECs surveyed had between nine and 15 members, with more males than females. Review meetings were held only occasionally owing to the competing interests of members, who receive no incentives for participation, and poor funding. Scientific and ethical reviews are conducted together by the same committee, but few members of the HRECs are trained in research ethics. Monitoring of research after approval is poor.Conclusion. Nigeria now has about 30 institutional HRECs, but their functioning is hampered by a shortage of both money and qualified individuals to serve on them. (shrink)

Traditionally, Sociology has identified its subject matter as a distinct set - social phenomena - that can be taken as quite different and largely disconnected from potentially relevant disciplines such as Psychology, Economics or Planetary Ecology. Within Sociology and Human Ecology, Smith and Jenks argue that this position is no longer sustainable. Indeed, exhorting the reader to confront human ecology and its relation to the physical and biological environments, Smith and Jenks suggest that the development of understanding with regards to (...) the position occupied by the social requires, in turn, an extension of the component disciplines and methodologies of a 'new' human socio-ecology. Aiming to evoke critical change to the possibility, status and range of the social sciences whilst also offering essential grounding for inter-disciplinary engagement, Sociology and Human Ecology will appeal to postgraduate students and postdoctoral researchers interested in fields such as Social Theory, Socio-Biology and Ecological Economics. (shrink)

This paper explores Ogyū Sorai’s 荻生徂徠 thinking on the most sensational and controversial incident of eighteenth-century Japan, and perhaps the most well-known in all Japanese history, the forty-seven rōnin incident of 1701–1703. Viewed in relation to his lifework, Sorai’s views on the incident are significant insofar as they reveal the extent to which his philosophical thinking was occasionally shaped decisively by neither ancient Chinese nor later Confucian texts, Neo- or otherwise, but instead by formative life-experiences he had as a youth (...) living in exile. No doubt, Confucian and Neo-Confucian notions, which Sorai knew in-depth, helped him filter, epistemologically, events, issues, and most importantly what he understood to be righteous and just behaviour in a polity. Yet ironically enough, Sorai’s thinking on the rōnin incident shows that however philosophically erudite, cosmopolitan, and urbane he was as an intellectual, his appraisals of things sometimes harked back to rural experiences he had early on with some of the most primitive and foundational expressions of human agency, civilization, and socio-political ethics in early-eighteenth century Japan. In the process, Sorai’s essay reveals, through its later resonance with some Meiji thought, how his views on those same primitive expressions remained relevant even in modern contexts. (shrink)

Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection to presentism employ a fundamentally tensed account of the relationship between truth and being. On this view, the truth of a proposition concerning the past supervenes on how things are, in the present, along with how things were, in the past. This tensed approach to truthmaking arises in response to pressure placed on presentists to abandon the standard response to the truthmaker objection, whereby one invokes presently existing entities as the supervenience base for (...) the truth of past-directed propositions. In this paper, I argue that a fundamentally tensed approach to truthmaking is implausible because it requires the existence of cross-temporal supervenience relations, which are anathema to presentism. (shrink)